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Abstract 
Banditry and the violent conflicts between herders and farmers in Nigeria have become potentially dangerous in 
recent time resulting in humanitarian emergencies as thousands have been killed and many more uprooted from 
their homes while both the Federal and State government appears clueless on how best to contain the conflicts. 
The spread of the conflict to southern states of the country is aggravating the fragile relations among ethnic 
nationalities and religious groups. President Buhari, a Muslim and Fulani, has been accused of allowing the attacks 
to continue, and his Vice President, Professor Osibanjo, a Christian, has been faulted for failing to speak out. At 
the heart of the conflicts are dispute over grazing on farmlands and cattle rustlings; expansion of agriculturist 
population and cultivated land at the expense, deteriorating environmental condition such as desertification; 
breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes, drug abuse, proliferation of 
small arms and outright criminality, all of which points to a national security failure. The loss of faith in the national 
security architecture which assumes the form of creation of Special Security Forces, resort to self-help by state 
governments and citizens’ groups, anti-grazing laws against ECOWAS protocol that allows unrestricted movement 
of animals for grazing across the countries in the sub-region and the culture of impunity. This paper examines the 
fundamental issues surrounding banditry and the Herders – Farmers conflict in Nigeria with a view to highlight its 
implications for national security in contemporary times. It is argued here that considering the seeming 
intractability of these conflicts and violence, it appears that the security architecture of the country has been 
hijacked and the Nigerian state has ceased to be in full control and command of the national security situation 
especially as the safety of life and property can no longer be guaranteed. The security regime has been hijacked, 
undermined, and compromised by non-state actors who operate confidently with reckless abandon and little 
decency and respect for human life. 
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Introduction 
It appears that Nigeria’s security regime has been hijacked, undermined, and compromised by non-state actors 
who operate confidently with reckless abandon and little decency and respect for human life. It is safe to argue 
that there is at the moment no singular notion of national security. Rather, there exists competing notion of security 
advanced by the contending forces in the Nigerian state.  This implies that the state itself is at issue in most conflicts. 
Hence national security has to be seen as distinct from state security and regime security, with each component of 
society competing to preserve and protect its own well-being. What emerges in such contentious environment can 
be better characterized as an insecurity dilemma, the obvious consequences of competition of the various forces 
in society being less effective security for all or for certain sectors of the population, less effective capacity of 
centralized state institutions to provide security of life and property and increased vulnerability of the state and its 
people to influence and control by non-state actors.   
Although insecurity in many Northern States is a to very large extent, a consequence of Boko Haram 
insurgency in the North East, rural banditry and cattle rustling especially in the North West and North Central 
zones have assumed alarming proportions. The killings continue remorselessly and even ruthlessly unabated. It 
appears that Nigerians have simply become inured of these horrific killings; they seemed to have been robbed of 
their sense of feeling and their nationhood tragically. In fact, cases of farmers-herders have been widespread in 
Nigeria in recent times. Conflict emanating from cattle-grazing actually accounted for thirty-five percent (35%) of 
all reported cases between 1991 and 2005. Out of reported 389 incidents of herders and farmers conflict from 1997 
to 2015, 371 had occurred in the Middle-Belt, otherwise known as the North-Central. The North-Central states 
namely Benue, the Federal Capital Territory, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara and Plateau are the most affected 
areas in the country (SCA, 2016).  
Conflict and violence between herders and farmers has also become a common occurrence and regularity in 
the North-West zone in general often resulting in heavy losses of lives and destruction of property as well as the 
killing of livestock. Conflict between herders and farmers have also manifested as the most prominent, violent 
incidents, by far, in several states in the South-West. The recurrence of conflict between farmers-herders in the 
South-East zone, especially in Enugu state, is an affirmation of the seeming ubiquitous nature of farmers-herders’ 
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crisis across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria (SCA, 2016). In all cases, incidents of cattle rustling have 
become more frequent and severe, degenerating into militarized activity with no precedence in the history of cattle 
rustling as it manifests itself with devastating acts of human slaughter, rape, burning of pasture and settlement 
structures, abductions and utmost revenge. Conflict have overwhelmed state security forces, eroded traditional 
conflict management mechanisms and adversely impacted on pastoral mobility and environmental resources. 
Closely related with cattle rustlings is the rise of banditry activities. Banditry is largely characterized by armed 
criminal gangs, the waylaying of travellers, including live stocks in transit, and relieving the victims of their 
possessions. Banditry is common in areas associated with farmers and herders conflict, highways. The situation is 
so bad that the Global Terrorism Index, a comprehensive study by the Institute for Economic and Peace Analysis 
Impact of terrorism on 163 countries covering 99.7% of the world’s population ranked Nigeria as Number 3 only 
after Iraq and Afghanistan, with Syria, Pakistan and Somalia performing better than Nigeria. Although Kidnapping 
started in Southern part of the country, it has together with banditry become an industry in the North, with villages 
having to pay communal ransoms (Mu’azu, 2018).  
The human rights watch dog, Amnesty International (AI) said it independently verified estimated figures 
showed that from January to June 2018; at least 1, 813 people were murdered in seventeen states. This doubles the 
894 people killed in 2017 and that the death toll reflects killings as a result of farmers-herders conflict, communal 
clashes, Boko Haram attacks and banditry. The human rights watch dog is gravely concerned about the rising spate 
of killings across the country, especially the communal clashes between farmers and herders and attacks by bandits 
across at least seventeen states. It is the group’s considered opinion that the Nigerian authorities have a 
responsibility to protect life and property, but they are clearly not doing enough against the backdrop that the attack 
on Plateau state where armed gunmen attacked eleven villages on June 23, 2018 for at least seven hours and killed 
at least 200 villagers without intervention from State Security forces (Jimoh, Abuh and Deka, 2018). Ahovi (2018) 
confirmed the incidents thus: 
“It was killing spree by unknown gunmen yesterday (June, 24, 2018) in Plateau. Unconfirmed 
reports put the number of people killed at more than 100. The attacks said to have started at 
about 11.00pm occurred in the three local government areas of Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Jos 
South, and are reportedly ongoing. State governor, Simon La-long, cut short his attendance of 
the All Progressive Congress (APC) convention in Abuja, and has imposed a dusk-to-dawn 
curfew on the areas inhabited by the Berom ethnic group.” (2018:1).  
The Plateau State police spokesman Assistant Superintendent (ASP) Mathias Terna Tyopev, however stated 
that only eleven corpses were recovered at Gashish village in Barkin Ladi, urging the citizens to disregard the high 
figures reported on the social media. The spokesman of Operation Safe Haven (OPSH), Major Adam Umar, 
confirmed the attack but refused to disclose any casualty figures. He stated that sporadic shooting by the attackers 
attracted his men who mobilized quickly to the scene but that while the soldiers were busy repelling the first attack, 
another broke out elsewhere simultaneously (Ahovi, 2018). What is worrisome is that the violence in Plateau 
started after an attack, which was followed by reprisals from June 21, 2018 brought to the fore unacceptable 
security lapses despite the deployment of security forces, including the military in over thirty communities in the 
states. 
Furthermore, an estimated two thousand, seven hundred and thirty-two people (2,732) were killed in thirty-
three states and the Federal Capital Territory(FCT)-Abuja from violent incidents including attacks from Boko 
haram, Kidnapping, armed herders, various militia, and communal clashes between April and June, 2020 (Sanni, 
2020). The number of fatalities across the thirty-three states and the FCT incorporating the six Geo-Political zones 
in the country is frightening. According to SMB intelligence analysis, one thousand (1000) people were killed 
between January to March 2020, while one thousand, seven hundred and thirty-two (1,732) people were killed in 
April, 2020. The figure includes the number of deaths among security personnel in the country. Details of the SMB 
report showed that 221 security personnel including 173 soldiers, 39 police officers, 3 civil defence officers, and 
six vigilantes were killed in three months. The security index recorded 854 deaths of “terrorists and bandits” and 
502 insurgents. Borno State recorded the highest number of deaths with 941 killings. The rise in number of death 
of soldiers derived from increased attacks on the North-West (Sani, 2020). Government must answer the following 
questions: who are these attackers? Where do they come from? Where do they go after attacks? Who arms them? 
Why is security forces’ response time very slow? Answer to these fundamental questions must be provided. 
Otherwise, the killings will continue and killers will continue to go unpunished because those who should hold 
them accountable have sentimental attachment to them (Adebowale, 2018). 
 
Nature of the Problem 
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2018), over 1, 300 Nigerians have been killed in the conflict 
between herders and farmers in just seven months. ICG contended that the conflict has evolved from spontaneous 
reactions to provocations and now to deadlier planned attacks, particularly in Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa and Taraba 
States. Due to the general nature of insecurity in Nigeria in recent time, the herdsmen whose only equipment used 
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to be sticks and water bottles now carry sophisticated weapons as part of their work tools. Whenever they meet 
with confrontation as the search for grass and water they do not hesitate in employing violence. This accounts for 
the upsurge of violence in the North Central Region and some parts of the South West and South East. Thus it is 
estimated that in 2016 alone about 2500 persons were killed during the conflicts between these nomadic herders 
and sedentary food and cash crop farmers. Not only have people been killed in large numbers, farms have also 
been destroyed in the process. These clashes have been very bloody in various states including Benue, Plateau, 
Adamawa, Katsina, Taraba, Enugu, Imo, Ondo, and Ekiti(Ekpu, 2019). A few of these cases will underscore the 
unpalatable nature of the problem. 
Hoodlums on Saturday, 7th June, 2019 killed three brothers in their farm at Zakka village, Safana Local 
Council area of Katsina State. The victims were attacked on a farmland close to one of bases of the bandits. The 
victims who are of the same parents were in the farm when the bandits attacked them. This incident occurred less 
than one month after over thirty people were slaughtered by bandits in three council areas of Danmusa, Faskari 
and Batsari. On Sunday, June 16, 2019 the Zamfara State Police Command confirmed the killing of 34 persons by 
bandits in an attack on Tungar Kafau and Gidan Wawa Communities in Shinkafi Council Area of the State. Fresh 
attacks were reported in the night of Monday, June, 16, 2019 in Ardo-Kola and Donga Local Government Areas 
of Taraba during which houses and cars were also razed during the onslaught blamed on armed herdsmen. The 
incessant raids by armed herdsmen and ethnic conflicts in the State prompted the state government to impose a 
night curfew on the state (Michael, 2019, Akpeji, 2019). 
In spite of interventions by stakeholders to broker peace between the Tiv and Jukun ethnic groups in Benue 
and Taraba States, five persons were killed in a fresh attack on farms by Jukun on Gyenku in Ukum Local 
Government Area of Benue State. It would be recalled that this incidence took place barely one week after a 
military operation code named, Operation Whirl Stroke (OPWS) led by its Commander, Major General Adeyemi 
Yekini, held a peace and security meeting with youths, traditional rulers and other critical stakeholders in Benue 
and Taraba States, who signed at Kente in Taraba (Wentu, 2019). In a related development, armed men, suspected 
to be herdsmen invaded Koton-Karfi and Onzo communities in Kogi Local Council of Kogi State, killing 
unspecified number of person. The two separate attacks took place on Tuesday, June 25, 2019 between 2.00 am 
killing unspecified number persons. The attackers numbering over 30, fully armed with AK 47 and other dangerous 
weapons, invaded the communities and opened fire on the houses and the people. The armed bandits divided 
themselves for the coordinated attacks on the two communities. Three persons died on the spot during the attacks 
which lasted several hours (Obensa, 2019). 
More than 10 people were killed in the evening of Wednesday, July, 3, 2019 by bandits who rode on 
motorcycles and attacked four communities in Danmusa and Kankara Local Councils of Katsina State. The bandits 
first attacked Ungwar Nagwade community where they killed four people, then proceeded to Unguwar Rabo where 
they killed nine persons and later moved on to Gidan Daji where they killed two two residents, all in Kankara 
Council Area. The same group of bandits stormed Danmusa Council Area where they attacked traders at a market 
in Maidabino community during which more than a dozen people were killed and others injured while trying to 
flee for safety. The attacks took place while the heads of Nigeria’s security forces were meeting with President 
Buhari (Michael, 2019).  
For most part of 2019, the South-West region of Nigeria was under a siege as a result of widespread insecurity 
with banditry assuming and alarming dimension, kidnappers operating untamed, while herdsmen embarked on 
embarked on wanton destruction of lives and property at will. In fact, the Region reeled from unprecedented 
incidences of killings, kidnapping and rapes and other life-threatening incidents that made the city centres and 
roads unsafe for residents and travellers. On June 25, 2019, a commuter bus was waylaid in Akure-Ikere Road by 
gunmen and all passengers on board allegedly abducted and whisked to unknown destinations. In recent times, 
relatives and survivors have told series of pathetic tales of attacks carried out by killer herdsmen and other yet to 
be identified criminal elements that have continuously been terrorising the residents of South-West Region 
(Adeyemi, et al, 2019). 
Travellers and motorists are having a tough time doing their business. The manner in which the kidnappers 
launch attacks from the forests armed with sophisticated guns, shooting sporadically in the air and cart away their 
victims fill residents with fear every time they are about to embark on a road trip, especially in the evening. As a 
result, vehicular traffic thinned out in some roads in the zone. Most affected include the ever-busy Ibadan-Akure 
Road, Ondo-Ife Road, Osogbo-Ode Omu Road, Ado Ekiti-Akure Road, Ondo-Ife, Oshogbo-Ilesha Road, while 
Imeko-Abeokuta Road was almost deserted as a result of constant attacks by herdsmen. Consequently, commercial 
vehicles are forced to move in a convoy with escorts. Farmers in Oke-Ogun, Oyo State have taken to fleeing their 
farmlands at the sight of approaching herds of cattle as attacks survivors have always said their attackers and 
kidnappers resembled herdsmen, while some are always decked in military gear (Adeyemi, et al, 2019).  
The Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore estimated that 5000 cattle herders have been killed in several states in Nigeria 
in an ongoing conflict between nomadic herders and local communities. The Secretary-General of the organization, 
Saleh Alhassan lamented that enough has not been reported about the murder of herdsmen. He claimed that cattle 
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herders have been brutally killed, with at least two million cows lost since the conflict started in Plateau and Taraba 
states, Southern Kaduna and in parts of Kogi and Niger states without any consequence for the perpetrators. 
Alhassan also stated that members of the group have equally been victims in Zamfara state and a few other states 
in the North but the incidence were hardly reported. For instance, he stated that: 
“800 of our people were killed by a militia group in Manbilla Plateau. We also suffered the 
killing of 97 of our people by Bachama Militia in Numan, Adamawa State. In Southern Kaduna 
to be specific in Kajuru we lost 103 members. So far, 5000 of our people lost their lives in the 
last ten years, since the crisis erupted. The most painful thing is that nobody has been put on 
trial. Nobody has been charged. In Southern Kaduna, for instance, in 2011, 400 of our people 
were murdered and nothing was done to the people who perpetrated this dastardly act. Today, 
the killers are walking on the streets as free citizens. Nobody was arrested or prosecuted (Boda, 
2018:2.)   
 
Dynamics of the Insecurity Challenges 
An in-depth knowledge of the pastoral way of life and associated insecurity are very important for understanding 
the conflicts between herders and farmers because of its policy implications. Although herders are mostly Fulani, 
an average Fulani man cannot be labelled “pure pastoralist” because various categories of the society have different 
strategies to survive, varying from exploitation of people (the historical role of the elite) to the exploitation of 
cattle and land. Yet, the elite and pastoralists, even artisans and merchants/traders, refer to themselves as 
pastoralists, which they define as their occupational attribute of their identity. Only very few define themselves as 
cultivators, which no doubt they are, though they possess livestock in most cases. In the course history these 
strategies have changed completely. The boundaries between occupation strata were more rigidly observed in the 
past. In recent time, every one may occupy him/herself with various strategies (though with some exceptions). 
This situation makes it difficult to attach labels to them. In other words, should they be called pastoralists, 
indigenous rulers, cultivators, as they themselves do; or should their land use be analysed and labelled according 
to the general perception. Another problem is to investigate if their strategies to manage the environment are the 
best to cope with all the ecological insecurities they encounter. In fact, how are these strategies formed and 
continuously reformed in view of the ecological and political insecurities inherent in their environment? Some 
scholars and social commentators regard the accumulation of livestock, and the adaptation of herd management to 
the harsh environments pastoralists inhabit, as the central elements in pastoral pursuit (Aljumaa, 1995). 
The problem pastoralists had to face as a result of drought had led to reassessment of the concept of 
pastoralism. Against this backdrop, a high degree of diversity in strategies of pastoralists include increased 
inequalities based on class and gender, large scale migration to adjacent regions, rural centres, and towns, 
unwanted cultural change and social disintegration or even refugee camps as the final resort. This doom scenario 
culminated in a Hobbesian world of insecurity, war, famine and drought. It is therefore not unusual for pastoralists 
in crisis situations (such as drought, famine or inter communal wars/conflicts) to resort to numerous adaptive 
strategies to cope with these hazards. The coping strategies include herd diversification, adjustment of herd-size, 
increase of mobility, splitting up into small groups (herds and people) - temporary ‘sedentarization’. The point 
being made is that instability is an inherent characteristic of pastoral way of life. Consequently, pastoralism may 
be perceived as an adaptation to harsh climate circumstance, of which the central element is mobility. This implies 
that the herds have to be moved from scarce to more abundant regions. This is however a risky affair because 
animals of pastoralist are threatened by predation, animal diseases, and lack of pasture (Aljumaa, 1995). 
The second inherent source of instability of the pastoral way of life is political and military control over water 
and pasture for which contact with or control over the outside world is essential. Often times, water and feed are 
in short supply in the arid zone inhabited by pastoralists, and cultivators may seek to settle near these source of 
water blocking access to herds. The access of pastoralists to small arms and light weapons may partly derive from 
infiltration of fleeing Boko Haram terrorists whose capacity have been degraded by military offensive. Conflict 
between herders and farmers in over natural resources, especially competition for land has a long history in sub-
Saharan Africa in which herders and children were killed over competition for land has a long history in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Throughout the Western Sahel, due to expansion of agriculturalist population and cultivated land 
at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification and soil degradation; 
breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small 
arms and crimes in rural areas have been implicated in the conflicts (Foreign Affairs, 2015). In agreement with 
this view, Akinwotu (2018) submits that the population increases at an astronomical rate and the available land 
shrunk, farmers have settled on land that herders have used over the years as grazing routes to move their cattle 
seasonally. This issue in contemporary time have polarized Nigeria, especially the Middle Belt, the agrarian bread 
basket that stretches across the country. Herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria usually involve disputes over land and 
and/or cattle between herders (in particular the Fulani and Hausa) and farmers (especially the Tiv or Tarok). 
Although herders are mostly Fulani, an average Fulani man cannot be labelled “pure pastoralist” because 
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various categories of the society have different strategies to survive, varying from exploitation of people (the 
historical role of the elite) to the exploitation of cattle and land. Yet, the elite and pastoralists, even artisans and 
merchants/traders, refer to themselves as pastoralists, which they define as their occupational attribute of their 
identity. Only very few define themselves as cultivators, which no doubt they are, though they possess livestock 
in most cases. In the course history these strategies have changed completely. The boundaries between occupation 
strata were more rigidly observed in the past. In recent time, every one may occupy him/herself with various 
strategies (though with some exceptions). This situation makes it difficult to attach labels to them. In other words, 
should they be called pastoralists, indigenous rulers, cultivators, as they themselves do; or should their land use be 
analysed and labelled according to the general perception. Some scholars and social commentators regard the 
accumulation of livestock, and the adaptation of herd management to the harsh environments pastoralists inhabit, 
as the central elements in pastoral pursuit (Aljumaa, 1995). 
The problem pastoralists had to face as a result drought had led to reassessment of the concept of pastoralism. 
Against this backdrop, a high degree of diversity in strategies of pastoralists include increased inequalities based 
on class and gender, large scale migration to adjacent regions, rural centres, and towns, unwanted cultural change 
and social disintegration or even refugee camps as the final resort. This doom scenario culminated in a Hobbesian 
world of insecurity, war, famine and drought. It is therefore not unusual for pastoralists in crisis situations (such 
as drought, famine or inter communal wars/conflicts) to resort to numerous adaptive strategies to cope with these 
hazards. The coping strategies include herd diversification, adjustment of herd-size, increase of mobility, splitting 
up into small groups (herds and people)- temporary sedentarization. In fact, instability is an inherent characteristic 
of pastoral way of life. Consequently, pastoralism may be perceived as an adaptation to harsh climate circumstance, 
of which the central element is mobility. This implies that the herds have to be moved from scarce to more abundant 
regions. This is however a risky affair because animals of pastoralists are threatened by predation, animal diseases, 
and lack of pasture (Aljumaa, 1995). 
The second inherent source of instability of the pastoral way of life is political and military control over water 
and pasture for which contact with or control over the outside world is essential. Often times, water and feed are 
in short supply in the arid zone inhabited by pastoralists, and cultivators may seek to settle near these sources of 
water blocking access to herds. Consequently, conflict between herders and farmers in the main, derives from 
access to natural resources, especially competition for land. This competition for land in which herders and 
children were killed over competition for land has a long history in Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout the Western 
Sahel, due to expansion of agriculturalist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; 
deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification and soil degradation; breakdown in traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crimes in rural areas have 
been implicated in the conflicts (Foreign Affairs, 2015). In agreement with this view, Akinwotu (2018) submits 
that the population increases at an astronomical rate and the available land shrunk, farmers have settled on land 
that herders have used over the years as grazing routes to move their cattle seasonally. This issue in contemporary 
time have polarized Nigeria, especially the Middle Belt, the agrarian bread basket that stretches across the country. 
Herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria usually involve disputes over land and and/or cattle between herders (in 
particular the Fulani and Hausa) and farmers (especially the Tiv or Tarok). Military authorities attributed the surge 
in killing, in part, to migration of pastoralists from neighbouring countries especially Chad, Niger and Cameroon 
affected by changing climate conditions and insecurity.  
The Nigerian economy is shifting toward free-market principles, thus successive governments have 
undertaken painful transformations –from massive privatizations, to righting severer balance-of-payments problem 
to bringing massive fiscal deficits in checks. As difficult as this process has been, the country’s efforts in 
institutionalization of this market-oriented process and harnessing it to consolidate its fledging democratic 
institutions have even more challenging. An obvious consequence of cultivating and sustain these set of values is 
the stranglehold of poverty on majority of citizens. It cannot be denied that Nigeria suffers from deep-rooted human 
security crisis, as is evident in the distributional inequalities and massive social and physical infrastructure deficits 
that stand out clearly as the weak links in Nigeria’s political economy. The country is an important country of 
origin, transit and destination country for migrants in West African region. Consequently, migration scenarios such 
as regular labour migration, irregular or undocumented migration, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, 
internally displaced persons, and refugees have been associated with the country. There are more people emigrating 
from, than immigrating to the country resulting in persistent loss of potential agents of development as a result of 
emigration of highly skilled professionals abroad and death of thousands of youth who perish annually in their bid 
to illegally enter European countries. The fundamental drivers of migration include conflict, poverty and insecurity 
which demand comprehensive policy attention. It is also important that the report address newly-emerging 
migration trends and dynamics, including migration and terrorism, trade, climate change and disability (CISLAC, 
2016). 
The country’s human development index when compared with other countries is quite low. Curiously, as 
poverty and unemployment are increasing Nigeria continues to record impressive GDP growth rate. The United 
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Nations Global Multidimensional Poverty index published in 2015 has the following figures for Nigeria on poverty: 
“South-West-19.3%, South-East-25.2%, South-South-27.3%, North-Central-45.7%, North-East-76.8%, North-
West-80.9%. A sample from some States, Plateau-51.6%, Katsina-82.2%, Zamfara-91.1%, Ekiti-12.9%, Yobe-
90.2%, Lagos-8.5%, Anambra-11.2% and Edo-19.1%. The 2017 Oxford University Human Development 
Initiative Multidimensional Poverty index is basically the same as the United Nation’s. Zamfara is 92%. Now take 
a look at samples of literacy levels. Lagos, Imo, and Ekiti are 96%, Zamfara-19%, Sokoto-15%, Katsina-10% and 
Yobe-7%. According to the 2006 national population figures, Ekiti State’s population was 2,398,957, while Yobe 
was 2, 321,399. Ekiti State’s average monthly Federal Allocation Account Committee (FAAC) is N3.7 billion. 
Yobe State’s average monthly FAAC is N4billion, and in 2017 the net annual allocation to Yobe state was N39.5 
billion, while the net allocation to Ekiti was N25.6 billion. Annual internally generated revenue to Ekiti is N4.97 
billion, while Yobe is N3.5 billion. When you consider the fact that the 2017 FAAC allocation to Akwa Ibom State 
was N143 billion, Rivers State-N119 billion, and both Ekiti and Yobe States are essentially poor rural agrarian 
states with the same population. However, take a look at the following 2015 figures. Number of primary school 
classroom-Yobe-533, Ekiti-7086. Percentage of teachers qualified to teach, Yobe-22%, Ekiti-90%. 
Multidimensional Poverty Index for Ekiti is 12.9%, Yobe is 90.2, while the literacy rate for Ekiti is 96%, and Yobe 
is 7%; you can then see that the parts of the country that have the worst incidents of insurgency, banditry, terrorism 
and kidnapping are also the parts that have the worst and pervasive extreme poverty and low literacy level (Mu’azu, 
2019:18). 
Again, it was recently reported that: 
For 2019 Unity schools applications, of the 75,000 children that applied to sit for the Common 
Examination, 25,000 from Lagos State, while just 59 applied from Zamfara State. According 
to the 2006 population figures, Lagos was 9,113,604 while Zamfara was 3,278,873 thus 
Zamfara is more than one-third of the population of Lagos. If only 59 children applied out of a 
population of 3.2 million people, obviously there is a problem (Mu’azu, 2019:18). 
Mu’azu explained that the consequence of the above situation in the following words: 
Among the thousands of those unfortunate children who did not or were not able to apply are 
those with brains of professors, doctors, multi-billionaire industrialists, computer scientists 
and IT professionals. But when they are uneducated, unskilled, and poor, they have no 
opportunities and cannot create opportunities; they are thus potential bandits, kidnappers and 
terrorists (2019: 18). 
Collectively, the impact of these socio-economic inadequacies is strong enough to push the citizens to the 
brink. The manifestations of violent conflicts such as farmers- herders’ conflict and banditry are epiphenomenal. 
In fact, they are results of the yawning deficit of human security, hence should be urgently addressed because 
socio-economic prosperity can also help to assure peace. 
Proliferation of small arms has for a long time been a difficult nut for state security forces to crack. The 
revelation by one-time Minister of Interior retired Lt. General Abdulrahman Dambazau about 350 million arms 
are in wrong hands in the country underscores the enormity of the problem (Onani, 2018). Nigeria is categorized 
as an origin, destination and transit point of arms business. Nigeria was regarded as a transit point for small arms 
shipments to Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leon, when these countries were 
in conflict. With the end of conflicts in these countries, there was mass movement of weapons from West African 
countries, still using Nigeria as a transit point, to the central African countries. Nigeria is also a producer of craft 
guns like revolvers and short guns, which are categorized as SALW. Comparatively, they are inexpensive and easy 
to acquire, unlike the more expensive and sophisticated models of factory-made small arms. These locally 
produced guns are mainly used for hunting, community policing and self- defence. Local production of arms is 
associated with some towns in Delta, Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Oyo states, while fabrications are done in Plateau, 
Niger and Edo states (Modi, 2013). 
A great majority of the SALW in circulation in the country are those imported illegally from countries with 
loose weapons control systems such as countries in the former Eastern Europe and the defunct USSR (Union of 
Socialist Republics) reputed to have been the world’s largest exporter of arms to the Third World. The situation 
degenerated by the reported links between Bokoram and the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, AQIM, a branch of 
the international terrorists’ network based in Mali and Algeria. Over the years, the porous nature of Nigerian 
borders has dominated national discourse unfortunately not enough seem to have been done. The country’s borders 
cover about 5,000 kilometres (both land and littoral), with many designated entry points (Onani, 2018). In 
agreement with this view, Modi (2013) opines that Nigeria’s borders are massive with hundreds of footpaths 
crisscrossing to neighbouring countries. According to him, out of 27 local government areas in Borno State, nine 
share a common border with neighbouring countries. He stated that from villages in southern part of the state such 
as those in Gwoza Local Government, it is easier to access towns and cities across the border in Cameroon for 
business and leisure than Maiduguri, the capital of the state. In fact, because the weapons are small, light and 
collapsible makes it easy to be concealed and moved from one point to another. 
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The problem of Hard Drug use and trafficking has in recent time emerged as one of the serious challenges of 
the Nigerian state. Drug trafficking and consumptions had fuelled vicious wars in Latin America, Asia and in some 
African countries. It had caused a lot of personal anguish and serious insecurity in many countries. Consequently, 
Nigeria cannot afford to ignore it because drug abuse is no longer limited to its cities. Rural towns and villages are 
being immersed in this social pathology as well. Recent media reports about the spate of drug consumption in the 
country is frightening. No one is left out. In fact, men, women, youths and teenagers are increasingly involved in 
various degrees of intensity, from one State to another (Abdulraheem, 2018). 
Illicit drug trade did not assume a threatening dimension in Nigeria until the 1980s when some young and 
adventurous Nigerians discovered its lucrative nature in the developed countries. Faced with increasing drug trade 
volume, the Federal Government established the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) by Decree 
No. 48 of January, 1990. Its mandates include, “eliminating the growing, processing, manufacturing, selling, 
exporting and trafficking of hard drug”. While the agency has recorded tremendous success in its assigned role, it 
continues to face huge challenges because the sale, cultivation and use of hard drugs, especially cannabis, continues 
to thrive with more sophistication.  By the time the NDLEA was established, Nigeria had become a popular transit 
point between the Far East or Latin America and Europe. Nigeria was also known to produce high volume of 
cannabis (Indian hemp). Internationally, the country began to record negative image due to its drug connection. 
The point of fact is that in time past, the consumption of Indian hemp thrived in many parts of the country. Due to 
its very low price, it was within the reach of several young people. Sniffing of adhesive glues and some other 
materials that negatively alter the body functions were also in use. Although certain groups such as motor park 
touts, commercial sex workers, and jobless youths were known to indulge in illicit drug, the situation has changed 
such that other segments of society have joined the bang-wagon. Indian hemp is just one of the numerous 
destructive drugs that more and more people now consume. The Nigerian brand of politics in which youths are 
employed as thugs by politicians increases the indiscriminate and excessive use of hard drugs to make them 
heartless when they indulge in destructive activities.  
For Sunday and Salau, (2020), the Nigerian State is yet to show enough capacity in the fight against banditry 
because its kinetic approach has remained faulty due to lack of capacity on the part of the security agencies. Of 
note, is the absence of vital logistics equipment such as multi-modular mobility assets, all season and all-terrain 
transport assets, helicopters, motor cycles, and effective communication gadgets which could mage access to 
bandits in farming forests a huge task. Furthermore, the State’s seeming inability to adequately deploy men in 
strength to vulnerable communities in far flung parts of the country remains a huge set back in the fight against 
banditry and farmer-herders conflict. Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that the epic centre of banditry is 
North-West, states bordering Rugu forest including Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi and Niger have also 
witnessed deadly attacks up to Sokoto. Against this backdrop, it is problematic to conceive the problem as a 
regional rather than national as it goes beyond the North-West region. In fact, some bandits even come down South 
to kidnap their victims. 
It would be recalled that President Buhari in May 2018 directed the military to wipe out all bandits from 
Nigeria. Over two years after, the order is yet to be fulfilled. Unless the Nigerian government moves swiftly and 
takes timer action against criminal elements perpetrating insecurity and holding the country to ransom, “bedlam” 
may ensue as citizens may resort to self since the government cannot guarantee safety of lives and property 
(Sunday and Salau, 2020). The point worthy of note is that Miyetii Allah Kautal hore, led by Bello Abdu-Ilahi, 
ordinarily cattle breeders’ association has morphed into the equivalent of a terrorist organization operating without 
let or hindrance in the public space. Unfortunately, the organization’s sense of self-importance has grown in 
provocative proportions since the Buhari administration took over the governance of the country in 2015. The 
organization apart from threatening other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, in a rather vexatious manner, its leaders 
not long ago declared that “Nigeria belongs to Fulani” and that the “Fulani will rule forever”. He also alerted the 
Nation that his organization has concluded arrangements to set up its own security outfit of five thousand men and 
more to be deployed in all the states of the country. The Guardian Editorial explained the security implications of 
Bello Abdu-Ilahi’s unguarded utterance in the following words: 
“Such an asinine view would not have deserved a second read but for the implicit complicity 
of the federal authorities with the antics of these arrogant merchants of violence and mischief. 
There has been no reprimand from the presidency. Also, the security agencies have 
conveniently sealed their ears and looked the other way while words capable of inflaming 
passions are being thrown into the airwaves. Added to this is the entrenchment of settlements 
of herders inside bushes across the country from where they unleash violence on innocent 
citizens in communities and highways. Whereas Federal Government had asked all citizens to 
surrender their weapons, the order does not affect these murderous herdsmen. They can be 
seen carrying AK-47 freely while tending their cattle in certain parts of the country... The 
impression is that the president is willy-nilly promoting the sectarian interest of his kinsmen 
above and over the national interest. This is dangerous and a threat to the much-needed 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online)  
Vol.10, No.17, 2020 
 
34 
national cohesion “(The Guardian Editorial, 2020). 
Unless the Federal Government moves swiftly and takes firmer actions against criminal elements perpetrating 
insecurity and holding the Nigerian State to ransom, bedlam may ensue as the citizens may resort to self-help since 
government cannot guarantee safety of lives and property. More so, with the high command of the military 
authorities appear to be at their wits-end and the present crop of service chiefs in the saddle continues to exhibit 
ineffectiveness even if a change in tactics is affected. 
 
Federal and State Governments’ response to the Conflicts  
I contend that one of the core justifications for the existence of the Nigerian state, is the provision and sustenance 
of condition that ensure the security of lives and property of the citizens, so that they are free to express their free 
will in pursuits of self-fulfilment. Put differently, the irreducible function of the state is to continually secure itself 
against internal insurrection and external aggression by providing the security of lives and property of citizens. 
Ideological differences notwithstanding, this is the state’s most critical defining function. The “monopoly of the 
legitimate” use of force by which the state is defined- to defend itself against possible external aggression- and to 
secure its citizens against competing users of instrument of force speaks precisely to this point. This is only way 
the state harvests in return the loyalty of its citizens, which translates into high degree of legitimacy and the ready 
inclination to obey its laws. 
The Federal Government’s response had been largely through deployment of state security forces. 
Consequently, “Operation Safe Haven” was created for the North-Central and stationed in Plateau State with areas 
of operation extending to Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa and Kwara states to quell to quell ethno-religious conflicts and 
other criminal activities are cardinal evidence in this regard. Other government’s response includes constitution of 
Commissions of inquiry and humanitarian assistance to persons displaced by the conflict. In addition, some State 
governments in the zone drawing inspiration from the Niger Delta situation have also initiated amnesty 
programmes - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) - as forms of pardon for repentant warlords, 
yet conflicts and insecurity continue to impact on inhabitants of the zone. 
For the North-West, “Operation Sharan Daji/Operation Harbin Kunama 11 was established to battle armed 
bandits, cattle rustlers and robbers operating particularly in Zamfara, Kaduna and fringes of Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina 
and Kano States, yet the conflicts continue. Government’s review of the escalation of insecurity in the zone resulted 
in the launching of a new operation on Thursday, June 4, 2020 codenamed “Operation Accord” was launched on 
Thursday, June 4, 2020 to wipe out banditry, Kidnapping and other criminality from the North-West and North-
Central part of Nigeria. The operation was promptly planned by the military high command of the armed forces 
of Nigeria to tackle banditry and other violent crimes in the area. The troops through land and air offensives 
successfully neutralized 392 bandits and other criminal elements since the commencement of the operation in the 
two zones (Killte, 2020).  
Similarly, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Turkur Yusufu Buratai flagged off Operation SAHEL 
SANITY on the 6 July, 2020 as part of activities of the Nigerian Army Day celebration, 2020 during which the 
Nigerian Army Super Camp IV Faskari in Katsina State was established. The aim of the operation is to support 
Operation HADRIN DAJI in stemming the tides of the activities of armed bandits, cattle rustlers, kidnappers, 
incessant killings in the North-West zone of the country. These acts of criminality orchestrated by the bandits had 
before now crippled the agricultural, social and economic activities of the people of this zone. The people of the 
North-West zone felt the immediate impact of the operation with the tremendous success achieved within the short 
period of time. Eighty bandits were killed, 33 suspects arrested, 943 cows, 633 sheep/ram recovered and 7 AK47 
riffles, one GPMG, 16 Dane guns were captured in the onslaught against bandits in Katsina State by troops of 
Operation Sahel Sanity. 17 kidnap victims were also rescued, while 14 bandits’ informants and collaborators were 
arrested. In addition, several bandits’ camps including the notorious Dangote Triangle and their logistics bases 
were destroyed within the first month of the ant-bandit operation codenamed Operation Sahel Sanity (Ndidi, 2020). 
Prior to the creation of the above Special Security Forces, “Operation Mesa” had been operating as a nationwide 
security taskforce. It is called “Operation Yaki” in Kaduna State and “Operation Zenda” in Benue State. 
It appears that the Federal government’s high security “operations” have not achieved desired results, hence 
affected states and citizens’ decision to take their destiny in “their own hands” by devising measures to confront 
the insecurity challenge. Consequently, not a few Governors had set up security and vigilante groups to assist the 
police in their operations. In fact, the vigilante system has been invaluable in the North-East as the Civilian Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) have been acknowledged to have contributed immensely to the success recorded by the army 
in the fight against terrorism in that region. In fact, it is claimed that 23 states across the country currently have 
similar local security outfits. For instance, in Kaduna State, the state government in 2018 established a security 
outfit known as “Kaduna State Vigilance Service” to assist security agencies in to tackle criminality. Its function 
was to compliment the work of the police and other security agencies in intelligence gathering and crime 
prevention (Ojo, 2020).  
Sokoto State government also established a local security outfit called “Yan Banga”, which operates in all 
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most all villages in the state. “Yan Banga” tracks criminals and hands them over to security agencies for 
prosecution. Also in the state, the Governor Aminu Tambuwal’s administration retained Sokoto Corps Marshal 
established by the previous administration with offices in the 23 Local Councils of the state. The Marshals are 
posted to the state tertiary institutions and traffic joints in the state capital to compliment internal security of the 
areas. However, unlike the Corps Marshals which does not bear arms, the vigilantes are allowed to carry small 
arms such as single-barrel and pump action rifles which are registered with the police. In Zamfara State, the 
administration of Abulaziz Yari, had established arm-bearing “Yan Kansai” Local Vigilantes but the current 
government scrapped it and empowered the local vigilantes to carry out security functions without bearing arms. 
Vigilante committee were also set up in each of the 44 Local Councils of Kano State. A Local Chief called Mai 
Unguwa or any other prominent personality chairs each committee. The committee employ youths who provide 
security to such quarters where they are formed and they are paid allowance. Their jobs include checking 
movement of people at night, arresting thieves, and checking the activities of thugs and other criminal elements 
within the community they serve. The bear locally made guns and fire shots (Ojo, 2020). 
In Borno state, many local security outfits were created by the state government but for our purpose, the local 
hunters and vigilante groups, which have been working even before insurgency will suffice. Recently, the present 
state government employed the services of hunters across the North and neighbouring countries to boost the efforts 
at fighting insurgency and other forms of crimes. The groups carry light arms, locally made guns and pump action 
guns. The Ebony state, government established Neighbourhood Watch Group with members drawn from the 13 
Local Councils to compliment to compliment the efforts of state security forces in crime control and other security 
challenges in the state. The group carry handcuffs only to arrest criminals. In May 2016, the Government of Abia 
State revived a local vigilante outfit popularly known as the “Bakassi Boys” and directed all community chiefs to 
nominate ten youths for a two-week intensive training before deployment to rural communities. Furthermore, in 
July 2016, Cross River State Government announced plans to constitute a three thousand- member “Homeland 
Security Service”. Although member of this group do not bear arms, the outfit carry out activities such as providing 
intelligence on herders’ movement and activities (Afolalu & Audi, 2018). Similarly, the Enugu State Government 
engaged the services of 1,700 men in 2019 to serve as forest guards, its own model of vigilante. The members 
were drawn from the 17 local councils in the state. Its approach is consistent with community-based approach to 
securing lives of citizens. The Anambra State Government established Anambra Vigilant Services (AVS) and it 
operates in the 189 communities. The State government coordinates the activities of AVS through an appointed 
coordinator. In Taraba, the State government created the Taraba Marshalls in 2018 to tackle insecurity and other 
violent crimes few of the members carry locally made guns, while a few others armed cutlasses and horsewhip.  
Against the background of widespread insecurity, with banditry taking an alarming turn, kidnappers operating 
untamed, criminals masquerading as herdsmen embarking on wanton destruction of lives and property at will, 
incidents and associated public outcry, South-West Governors, namely Dr. Kayode Fayemi (Ekiti State), 
Arakunrin Rotimi Akeredolu (Ondo State), Engr. Seyi Makinde (Oyo State), Prince Dapo Abiodun (Ogun State), 
Chief Adegboyega Oyetola (Osun State), and Mr. Babajide Sanwoolu (Lagos State) met in June 2019 at Ibadan 
and resolved to put aside their political differences to curb rising insecurity in the region and took far-reaching 
decisions to tackle the menace. One of those decisions included the formation of a joint Western Nigeria Security 
Network (WNSN). To actualize their dream of bringing forth a regional security outfit, the governors sought and 
secured of the National Security Adviser, Retired Gen. Babagana Monguno after which they moved to design a 
structure for the outfit, providing infrastructure, including patrol vans, high capacity motorbikes and motorcycles, 
communication gadgets as well as recruitment of personnel, with Ibadan designated as the coordinating centre. 
The outfit which is codenamed Operation Amotekun was launched in January 9, 2020 (Adeyemi, 2020; Ojo, 2020). 
The regional security outfit which will work in collaboration with existing security organizations in the 
country, especially the police will have a central control command under the Development Agenda for Western 
Nigeria (DAWN) Commission. However, every state will have its own offices and operate based on its peculiarity. 
With respect to funding, each state will fund its own branch of Operation Amotekun with support from their 
security trust funds. The Commissioner of Police in each state will oversee Amotekun. The operation will comprise 
personnel from groups like Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), local hunters 
and Nigeria Peace Corps, among others. Apart from the vigilante groups operating within each state, Amotekun 
will draw its membership from security experts and statutory security agencies such as the police and the Nigerian 
Security and Civil Defence Corps. With each state operating from a given base, there will be Local Council organs 
which will coordinate Amotekun activities in each Local Council. The six South-West states’ commands will relate 
with the regional command to which each has contributed vehicles equipped with security and communication 
gadgets. The regional command will operate from the control centre in Ibadan, and will work closely with the 
DAWN Commission which provides administrative supervision to the project (Ojo, 2020). 
Since the recruits of Amotekun are largely from unconventional security personnel, the top echelon of the 
police in the region have been mandated with the technical aspects to avoid inter-agency rivalry and clashes among 
members during patrol and other activities. In addition, to providing security clearance on those recruited as 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online)  
Vol.10, No.17, 2020 
 
36 
members, the police would also exercise the legal power of arrest and prosecution and provide technical training 
and backup for Amotekun. The security outfit is designed to gather information about crimes and suspicious 
activities for interpretation and proper action, including prevention, management or counteraction. Amotekun will 
also undertake routine patrols in parts of highways in the region which the police are unable to cover day and night. 
Working with traditional rulers, its activities will also permeate local communities to keep an eye on suspicious 
residents, visitors and non-residents coming for business or related activities. The outfit is expected to deploy 
technology in its operations, including drones. By gathering intelligence and sharing it with the police and other 
statutory agencies, it is believed that these measures will go a long way in improving community peace and security 
across the South-West region (Ojo, 2020). 
Despite the lofty objectives of Amotekun it appears the establishment of the security outfit did not receive 
the approval of the Federal government. Abubakar Malami, Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of 
Justice argued that no State government, whether singly or in a group has a legal right and competence to establish 
any form of organization or agency for the defence of Nigeria or any of its constituent part. Malami appears to be 
worried that the South-West governors intend to usurp the constitutional right of the federal government to 
exclusively do what the constitution has exclusively empowered it to do (Agbese, 2020). Those opposed to the 
Justice Minister submitted that the issue of Amotekun is an issue of public safety and protection property, therefore 
is absolutely constitutional and legal. This school of thought argued forcefully that there is no law in Nigeria which 
prevents citizens from being able to secure their life and property. In fact, the Nigerian Police does not enjoy 
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to the protection of life and property. As a matter of fact, we have shown 
somewhere earlier in this paper that in many parts of the Nigeria various outfits have been performing the duty of 
protecting life and property. In context of the provisions of the country’s Criminal Code in Section 272-275, the 
right of citizens to arrest any person for committing an offence is legal and may be exercised individually or 
communally. While the debate rages, the protection of the life and property of the citizens await urgent action. 
 To check the activities to check the escalating conflicts between herders and farmers, Benue State 
government in November 2017 implemented the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law that 
outlawed open grazing in the state.  Ekiti and Taraba States took similar actions. The State laws required cattle 
owners to get their own ranches to cater for their herds and stop stomping over farmlands.  Miyetti Allah Kautai 
Hore (a Fulani socio-cultural group) claimed that the law was discriminatory and unfair to herdsmen. 
Unfortunately, then Minister of Defence, Mansur Dan-Ali twice publicly blamed the Anti-Open Grazing Law for 
the conflicts and called for its suspension as implemented in Benue, Ekiti and Taraba States. Edo State government 
planned to create fenced grazing areas with watering facilities, requiring herdsmen to feed their cattle there and 
pay for the services. Herders, who consider these restrictive, often fail to comply as they still roam their cattle 
widely (Afolalu & Audi, 2018).   The Federal government unwilling to back the anti-open grazing law, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development floated the idea of creating colonies for herdsmen in January 2018. The 
cattle colonies are a combination of several ranches. According the government, ranching and colonies are similar 
in many respects except that a colony is bigger than a ranch. In a colony, 20 to 30 ranches can share the same 
colony, a ranch is usually owned by an individual or company with few numbers of cows, in a cattle colony one 
could find 100; 200, 300 cows owned by different individuals. Furthermore, the maintenance of ranches is so 
costly that rural subsistence low-earning herders would find it difficult to survive without colonies (Toroiyiade, 
2018). 
The National Economic Council (NEC) presented the National Livestock Transformation Plan (2018-2027) 
as its new initiative to put an end to the herders-farmers conflict and massively improve the livestock industry. 
The initiative insists that is the way forward for cattle rearing in Nigeria. Under the new plan, cattle herders are 
expected to be registered and recognized with cooperatives for the purpose of the ranching scheme. These 
cooperatives will then be able to get rental agreement for land from state governments and also benefit from ranch 
resources in several terms including loans, grants, and subsidies. The funding of the plan from the federal and state 
governments is expected to last for the first three years in the pilot phase for a total of N70 billion while private 
sector interests and investment between the third and tenth year is expected to be in excess of N100 billion. The 
proposed ranch size models according to the plan, is a cluster of 30, 60, 150, and 300 cows ranched in a location 
within the donated reserves. Ten pilot states: Adamawa, Benue, Edo, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Oyo, Plateau, Taraba, 
and Zamfara have been selected for the plan with 94 ranches to be established and operational in clusters of 4 
ranches in 24 locations. While Miyetti Allah group approve the Federal Government’s plan, some of the pilot 
states: Benue and Ebonyi states are reluctant to implement the plan (Toroiyiade, 2018). 
 
Conclusion 
Herders-farmers conflict and banditry in Nigeria have escalated in recent years spreading southward, threatening 
the country’s security and stability. The root of the conflicts can be attributed to climate induced environmental 
degradation of pastures in the far North, cattle rustling and clashes over grazing on farmland which often times 
pitch the farmers in violent conflict with herders. Herders accuse natives along grazing roots of stealing their cows 
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which result in clashes over land and/or cattle between herders and farmers. Also implicated in the conflicts are 
desertification, breakdown in indigenous conflict resolution mechanism of land and water disputes, proliferation 
of small arms, drug addiction and crime especially, banditry; militia attacks, poor government response to distress 
calls/report of attacks. However, as and Erondu and Nwakanma (2018) had noted, irrespective of its sources and 
variations, these conflicts are impacting dangerously on sustainable development in the country. 
In general terms, it appears that security of life and property can no longer be guaranteed as Government 
ceased to be in full control and command of the national security situation, especially as it affects common citizens. 
The security regime has been hijacked, undermined, and compromised by non-state actors who operate confidently 
with reckless abandon and little decency and respect for human life. The Federal and State governments have 
proposed, adopted and implemented a number of policies such as creation of Special Security Forces, new laws 
banning open grazing especially in Benue and Taraba states, National Livestock Transformation Plan which 
include ranching, cattle colonies to address the lingering conflict, yet, the conflict remain unabated. The inability 
of government to restore law and order, have led to creation of self-defence forces and ethnic militias and vigilantes 
which aggravated violence. 
The size of the Nigeria Police Force is also grossly inadequate to the population of the country in terms of 
security and crime management; hence, the urgent need to increase the size of the force. To stem the tide of attacks 
on residents of rural communities, government should deploy more state security forces to vulnerable areas and 
ensure perpetrators of attacks are arrested and prosecuted.  
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